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Abstract 
One of the institutions in which the gender gap remains a contestable issue is the 
board of directors, where the proportion of female directors is still low. While some 
countries have achieved higher proportions of female directors on their corporate 
boards, others have not registered even a single one. Drawing on social role theory, 
that places emphasis on traditional gender activities, this study starts by arguing that 
board directorship is an agentic role and more suitable for men. The study shows that 
key social institutions have the potential to alleviate such stereotypical attitudes or to 
maintain the status quo. Employing a robust statistical technique in two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), this study finds that the representation of women in other key 
national institutions, such as in politics, positively affects the appointment of female 
directors on boards. On the other hand, religiosity has a negative causal effect on 
female board appointments.  
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Introduction 
 
The lack of female representation on corporate boards has attracted the 
attention of academics (Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 2007), policy makers 
(OECD, 2009), practitioners and civil society (Catalyst, 2007). Part of this interest 
derives from the observed and perceived importance of achieving gender equity in 
societal and political leadership (Bullough, Kroeck, Newbury, Kundu & Lowe, 2012) 
as well as in firms (Nielsen & Huse, 2010).  
Explanations for the representation of women in elite leadership roles 
traditionally focused on the idea that a lack of qualified women created a “pipeline 
problem”. This shortage of qualified women has been ascribed to a variety of causes, 
including women’s family responsibilities (Greenhaus & Parasuraman, 1999) and 
inherited tendencies for women to display fewer of the traits and motivations that are 
necessary to attain and achieve success in high-level positions (Browne, 1999; Carter, 
D'Souza, Simkins & Simpson, 2010; Goldberg, 1993).    
Another explanation resides in gender role attitudes, “the opinions and beliefs 
about the ways that family and work roles do and should differ based on sex” (Harris 
& Firestone, 1998: 239). Indeed, some societies hold traditional gender role attitudes 
and believe in a clear division of labor, where “men must be more concerned with 
economic and other achievements, while women must be concerned with taking care 
of people in general and of children in particular” (Hofstede, 2001: 280). In contrast, 
non-traditional gender role attitudes in some societies suggest a less distinct gender-
role-based division of labor, where men and women share various responsibilities 
(Van Yperen & Buunk, 1991). We argue that, this view, consistent with insights from 
social psychology on gender differences and social roles, (Wood & Eagly, 2012) may 
provide better understanding of gender disparity on corporate boards.  
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Social role theory potentially undergirds the lack of female representation, 
positing that differences in societal roles lead men and women to demonstrate and 
value different types of interpersonal behaviors (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Johannesen-
Schmidt, 2001). The perception is that men tend to value and engage in more 
assertive, competitive and agentic behaviors, whereas, because women traditionally 
occupy more caretaking roles, they tend to value and engage in more communal 
behaviors (Eagly, 1987; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell & Ristikari, 2011).This common 
placement of women and men into prescribed roles produces gender stereotypes by 
observing their behavior in such roles. Such stereotypical perceptions are shared by 
individuals in a society, from where they derive their legitimacy, and are thus 
culturally consensual.    
Applying the foregoing reasoning, in the context of the workplace and indeed 
the boardroom, women are, therefore, more likely than men to hold positions at low 
levels in hierarchies of status and authority and are less likely to be at the highest 
levels of organizational hierarchies (Heilman, 2001; Wood & Eagly, 2012) where 
agency is expected.  
 Notwithstanding the power and commonality of gender role perceptions, there 
is evidence that in some hunter-gatherer societies, even men sometimes perform 
substantial infant care (Fouts, 2008). Moreover, in many industrialized societies some 
men pursue female-dominated professions such as nursing or social work (Sayer, 
Cohen & Casper, 2004). The fact that men and women sometimes engage in gender 
atypical activities suggests flexible behavior that is not rigidly differentiated by sex 
(Wood & Eagly, 2012), but one that is shaped by situational/contextual demands. This 
implies that both sexes can be socially sensitive or aggressive, given appropriate 
socialization and support from the social environment, where beliefs and practices are 
5 
 
shared and subsequently modified (Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Tennie, Call & 
Tomasello, 2009).   
In addition, the fact that gender roles are a social construction, manifest in 
stereotypes (Eagly & Karau, 2002), suggests that these [stereotypes] could be broken 
down only by genuine social change. Such social change could see occupational and 
domestic-work segregation weakened, consequently changing the perception of 
women and men roles with an inclination to equality. Arguing for the inevitable rise 
of women’s status, Jackson (1998) emphasizes that changes in economic, cultural and 
political systems over the years alleviated women’s disadvantages by improving their 
access to positions. As economies got better, production and power once the preserve 
of the household (where men played a superior role) moved to economic and political 
organizations, thus reducing men’s dominance. This observation underscores the 
salience and role of social institutions in facilitating or inhibiting gender roles. 
However, countries’ economic, political and cultural institutions have 
progressed at differing rates. As such, at the country level, institutional environments, 
and by extension, social institutions vary, suggesting different levels in the potential 
to either minimize or enhance gender roles and stereotypes. Indeed, Jackson (1998) 
posits that the timing, rate and form of specific changes around issues of gender 
inequality have varied considerably across countries.   
In the context of this study, we argue that some countries would, therefore, 
have higher proportions of female directors on boards than others. Drawing on social 
role theory, and in particular considering the extent to which gender role attitudes 
differ among societies, this study seeks to explore the institutional factors that 
potentially lead to varying levels of female board appointments across countries.    
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Two streams of literatures are of relevance to our study. The first stream 
relates to the association between gender role attitudes and critical issues related to 
the workplace environment for women (Eyring & Stead, 1998; Kirchmeyer, 2002). 
The second examines the presence of women on boards within particular country 
settings including the UK (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004), the 
US (Peterson & Philpot, 2007) Switzerland (Ruigrok, Peck &Tacheva, 2007) and 
Norway (Nielsen & Huse, 2010).  
While much has been written about this subject in single country studies, only 
a few researchers (Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Terjesen & Singh, 2008) have 
focused their attention on cross-national studies. Using data from 38 countries over 
the years 2001 to 2007, Grosvold, & Brammer (2011) place countries in clusters 
defined by national institutional systems, akin to varieties of capitalism (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), to understand the proportion of female 
directors on boards. On their part, Terjesen & Singh (2008) find that countries with 
higher representation of women on boards are more likely to have women in senior 
management and equal ratios of male to female pay.  
Our paper offers several contributions.  First, this study employs a social 
psychology lens i.e. social role theory to understand a topical corporate governance 
issue on board gender diversity, not only in a single country but across forty-five 
countries. Indeed, this work builds on previous studies, contributing to the growing 
literature on gender diversity and the appointment of women to upper echelons of 
firms across the world. As such, this study emphasizes the salience and diversity of 
the institutional environments obtaining around the world (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003).  
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Second, our study is interdisciplinary, bringing together various strands of 
literature: international business, corporate governance, gender, politics and 
development studies. Such an approach facilitates better understanding of the subject 
at hand, providing more awareness of the developments in various disciplines.  Third, 
this study improves our understanding of the macro-factors that determine gender 
diversity of corporate boards. Fourth, this paper potentially helps companies to 
understand the institutional environment in which they operate and more importantly 
how to react to it when making board appointment decisions.  
 
 
Theory and hypotheses 
 
According to social role theory, the perceived differences in the behavior of 
women and men originate in the contrasting distributions of men and women into 
social roles (Eagly, 1987). Thus, men and women are thought to possess attributes 
that equip them for sex-typical roles. For example, men are more likely than women 
to be employed, especially in authority positions, and women are more likely than 
men to fill caretaking roles at home as well as in employment settings (Eagly & 
Wood, 2012). As such, gender differences and similarities in behavior reflect 
consensually-shared gender role beliefs or gender stereotypes that in turn represent 
society’s perceptions of men’s and women’s social roles in the community in which 
they live.   
Sharing these beliefs as people in a society, gender roles get established and 
accepted by individuals who constitute the community. Individually, people act on 
their beliefs, recognize that others think similarly, and know that others act on this 
shared knowledge (Ridgeway, 2006). As such, these typical attributes tend to be seen 
as desirable and admirable for each sex, adding prescriptiveness to and consensus on 
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gender roles. Because these social roles are consensual, societies equip men and 
women by undertaking extensive socialization to promote personality traits and skills 
that facilitate role performance. 
Thus, drawing mainly on social role theory, extant research suggests that men 
and women respond differently to various aspects of social relationships, which can 
be categorized as either communal or agentic (Eagly, 1987; Koenig, et al., 2011). The 
communal dimension is interpersonally oriented and broadly described as a concern 
for the welfare of others (e.g., nurturing, sympathetic, friendly), with women scoring 
higher on this dimension than men (Eagly, 1987, 2009; Spence & Buckner, 2000). 
While these stereotypes may be perceived as positive in content, however, they serve 
to justify women’s continued acceptance of their traditional social roles (Glick & 
Fiske, 2001). Moreover, they can undoubtedly possess negative consequences for 
women, as they are suggested to undermine perceptions of competence and power 
(Jost & Kay, 2005).   
On the other hand, the agentic dimension is task-oriented and defined by 
independent, masterful, and assertive tendencies (e.g., competitive, ambitious, 
dominating), with men scoring higher on this dimension than women (Eagly, 1987; 
Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; Spence & Buckner, 2000). 
Some literature suggests that the stereotypically female characteristic of 
nurturance is valued less in the labor market than the stereotypically male 
characteristic of aggressiveness (Kilbourne & England, 1996). Furthermore, women 
who have internalized traditional beliefs about how women should act may be less 
likely to behave assertively when they do not get promotion (Betz & Fitzgerald, 
1987). Both situations suggest that women with traditional gender role orientations 
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would aspire less to gain board seats, while those with no traditional role orientations 
would be more inclined to gaining board appointments.  
Social institutions and gender role attitudes 
The fact that societies undertake socialization to enable men and women to fit 
in their prescribed roles, suggests that the institutional environment plays a significant 
part in defining gender role beliefs. This also suggests that there should be variation 
from one context to the other or between countries in terms of gender role attitudes 
and consequently women’s access to key positions of authority.  
Several studies have examined how countries differ in their institutional 
environments, leading to differences in practices and how such practices are 
interpreted by their respective social institutions (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Kostova, 
1999). For example, Kostova (1999) provides a compelling explanation on how a 
country’s institutional profile is configured. The country institutional profile refers to 
“the set of all relevant institutions that have been established over time, operate in that 
country, and get transmitted into organizations through individuals” (Kostova, 1997: 
180). The country institutional profile can be understood through three components 
namely, regulatory (e.g., laws and rules) cognitive (e.g., shared knowledge), and 
normative (e.g., attitudes, values and norms). The three components form three pillars 
of Scott’s (1995) conception of social institutions.    
As mentioned earlier, societies develop gender role attitudes, and people 
conform to such expectations through the way they behave both at home and work. 
Gender role attitudes are, therefore, a function of social institutions that uphold and 
transmit norms and values. This suggests that if social institutions change, gender role 
attitudes may follow suit. We argue, therefore, that countries with social institutions 
that place or facilitate less emphasis on traditional gender roles are likely to witness 
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equality or near equality of opportunities by both men and women and vice versa.  
Indeed, research suggests that the salience of a particular stereotype may be dictated 
by context (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; van Knippenberg, van 
Twuyver, & Pepels, 1994). For instance, the stereotypical belief that women do or do 
not possess the qualities to be board directors may depend on the institutional 
environment. In the context of this study such beliefs may vary from one country to 
the next. 
In this paper, we consider three important social institutions that have the 
potential to differentially shape gender role attitudes across countries, namely the 
political system (representation of women in parliament), the economic system and 
the degree of religiosity. Of the many social institutions, the gender literature suggests 
that the three in our study are arguably the most important factors of the institutional 
environment for developing the taken-for-granted elements of gender roles (Lindsey, 
2005). Moreover, while not tested empirically, Jackson’s (1998) thesis is that the 
evolution of economic and political systems explains the levels of gender inequality 
across countries. In the sections below, we discuss the link between these key social 
institutions and the presence of women on boards, providing our hypotheses in the 
process. 
Representation of women in politics  
We argue that it is plausible that gender stereotypes and their attendant effects 
could be observed at varying levels in different institutions within a given period of 
time. Specifically, political science literature shows that progress by women in 
politics and government was made earlier (Skjeie, 1991) and far exceeds that made in 
business. For example, in Norway the proportion of women in the Norwegian 
government and politics has since been higher, compared to other areas of the labor 
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market such as academia and the private sector (Seierstad & Healy, 2012; Seierstad & 
Opsahl, 2011). However, such other areas, in particular, the private sector are 
catching up. We argue that this development is partly due to the fact that the 
successful entry of women in politics and government encourages other women who 
are in business to aim higher too, putting themselves forward for board seats.  
This observation illustrates two important issues. First, it lends support to the 
central argument in this paper that social institutions vary in their potential to break 
down traditional gender social roles.  Second, it shows that the breaking down of 
gender role stereotypes in one part of society could serve as a reference point to 
initiate social change in others. In this case, the breaking down of gender role 
stereotypes is catalyzed by social learning, a process by which an individual learns 
from his neighbors’ experiences or social referents about their previous decisions and 
outcomes, behavior or practices (Munshi, 2003). Here, the importance and motivation 
of learning from social referents, via observation, imitation, and modelling cannot be 
underestimated (Bandura, 1977). This suggests that much of human behavior is 
learned through the influence of example. In the context of this study, seeing more 
women in government or politics should increase the tendency of the observer 
(women in business) to aspire for equivalent roles in business.  Consequently, this 
effectively reduces the traditional gender role attitudes by both men and women in the 
corporate sector. 
There are similarities between the two groups (in politics and business) of 
women. For instance, like board directors, members of parliament or government 
ministers are elected or appointed on the basis of their knowledge, skills and 
experience. Moreover, there have been calls for both business and politics to appoint 
women to the highest echelons of leadership (Seierstad & Healy, 2012).  
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With such similarities in the backgrounds for the two groups of women and in 
the requisite qualifications for the tasks, it would be expected that success achieved by 
one part is likely to be an encouragement for the other. We argue, therefore, that 
countries that have achieved success i.e. higher proportions of female members in 
high level politics have managed to reverse traditional gender role attitudes in one 
area and are more likely to repeat this in others, including on corporate boards.   
We, therefore, suggest that the extent to which women are represented in 
politics may determine the proportion of female directors in other key institutions, 
including on corporate boards.  
Hypothesis 1. The level of women’s representation in politics will positively impact 
on the prevalence of women on boards of corporate directors. 
  
Economic freedom  
Earlier, we argued that gender stereotypes are likely to be broken down 
through social change, whereby occupational and domestic-work segregation weaken, 
thus changing the perception of men and women attributes. We argue that economic 
development has the potential to provide this social change. Indeed, economic growth 
increases the number of job vacancies that need to be filled, at all levels.  
Two things are likely to happen that would mean more women in employment 
and potentially in high-ranking posts. The first is that an expanding economy suggests 
that with time there would be a shortage of skilled labor from the traditional sources. 
Thus, where companies had been recruiting more men for executive posts, they may 
find difficulties to carry on doing this as the competition intensifies. Companies 
would then seek to recruit from alternative sources, hence the appointment of women 
across all levels of the company hierarchy. Secondly, because of the high demand for 
labor that results from a growing economy, companies may offer higher wages thus 
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encouraging more women to take paid jobs as opposed to staying home. Both 
scenarios carry significant and positive changes in the context of gender role attitudes 
and subsequent appointment to the upper echelons of the organization. Indeed, 
increased participation in the workforce by women leads to the adoption of new 
gender role attitudes as more women work alongside men.  
We argue, therefore, that countries that are more economically developed are 
more likely to have less traditional gender role attitudes, suggesting that more women 
would be appointed to corporate boards. As Matland (1998: 114) notes: 
“Development leads to weakening of traditional values, decreased fertility rates, 
increased urbanization, greater educational and labor force participation for women, 
and attitudinal changes in perceptions of the appropriate roles for women.”   In the 
context of our study, we therefore expect that women are more likely to be appointed 
as directors on boards in a country that has developed economic institutions. We, 
therefore, hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. The institutional development of a country’s economic environment is 
positively impacts on the prevalence of women on boards of corporate directors.   
     
Religiosity 
Religions, the shared set of beliefs, activities, and institutions based on faith in 
supernatural forces (Stark & Bainbridge, 1985), are important social institutions in 
most societies (Iannaccone, 1991). Consequently, religious doctrine has been known 
to characterize variation in country attitudes in general, thus may, in particular, play 
an important role in shaping attitudes toward women’s place in leadership.  
With reference to the longstanding issue of gender inequality, scholars agree 
on the continued role of religion in maintaining the status quo (Bendroth, 1993; 
Woodhead, 2006). In fact, religion’s central role in consolidating gender differences 
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and inequality was recognized, explored and critiqued by nineteenth-century feminists 
like Elizabeth Cady Stanton (Woodhead, 2006). In recent years, studies have found 
that levels of gender equality across different countries are related to cultural factors – 
above all, religiosity (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Such studies show, too, that cross-
sectional differences in support for gender equality vary even between societies at 
similar levels of development, and depend upon the degree of religiosity. This has 
prompted Inglehart & Norris (2003) to conclude that, ‘religion matters, not only for 
cultural attitudes but for the opportunities and constraints on women’s lives, such as 
the ratio of females to males in educational enrolment, the female adult literacy rate, 
the use of contraception as well as for opportunities for women in the paid workforce’ 
(2003: 69). Religion, therefore, matters for opportunities for women to gain board 
appointments. This is not, however, a question of religious men simply imposing 
religious attitudes upon women, for traditional gender values and roles tend to be 
shared by both sexes in the same type of society (Woodhead, 2007).  
In general, religious institutions often prescribe what is considered right and 
wrong, acceptable and unacceptable (Turner, 1997) and tend to be conservative or 
patriarchal in their views about the place of women, both in the church hierarchy and 
in society (Kenworthy & Malami, 1999). We add that 1religions can and do promote 
gender stereotypes by their portrayal of ideal relations between the sexes (e.g., 
veneration of Mary, mother of Jesus; no women in Catholic priesthood). Indeed, 
previous research suggests that most religions encourage and reinforce values 
consistent with traditional gender roles (Lindsey, 2005; Sjoberg, 2004) “that include 
separate subordinate positions for women” (Banaszak & Plutzer, 1993: 149).  
                                                 
1 We are grateful to one of our reǀieǁers for this suggestion.  
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Given the arguments we make above, therefore, most religions tend to 
promote distinct gender roles, and consistent with social role theory most societal 
members use religion to justify such arrangements. Therefore, countries with higher 
levels of religiosity are more likely to have individuals exposed to views promoting 
traditional gender roles (Lindsey, 2005). From such societies, it is more likely that 
firms, through their agents (CEOs, Chairmen and nomination committees), view 
traditional gender roles as the norm, suggesting fewer board appointments for women.   
Following these arguments we propose that: 
Hypothesis 3. The degree of religiosity in a society relates negatively to the 
proportion of female directors on the board.   
 
 
Methodology 
 
Sample and data 
 
Our study explores the social triggers and barriers that explain the prevalence 
of women on corporate boards across the world. To achieve our objectives, we use a 
sample of 45 countries, taking an average of observations over seven years from 2007 
through 2013. These countries are drawn from all the continents, however, in varying 
proportions. Table 1 shows the distribution of the countries by region. The highest 
number of countries is from Europe (16), followed by Asia (13). Table 1 below shows 
the sample of countries in six regions. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Measures 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Our dependent variable is the average percentage of women on boards 
(womboard) for the years 2007 through 2013 in a given country. Data on this variable 
was collected from the annual reports prepared by GMI. For example, the GMI report 
titled GMI Ratings’ 2013 Women on Boards Survey contains data for the 45 countries 
for the years 2008 through 2013. Data for 2007 was collected from surveys carried 
out by Catalyst. We triangulated this data by using McKinsey & Company Report 1 
abovefor the year 2007. Since 2007, McKinsey has been researching the business case 
for increasing the number of women in senior management roles, published in the 
series titled Women Matter. While not all the countries in our sample are covered in 
this report, we used the ones provided therein to verify the reliability of the data 
provided by Catalyst.  
Independent variables 
 
Our approach involves generating a set of independent variables that capture 
key social institutions namely economic, political and religion. For Hypothesis 1 we 
use the average percentage of women in parliament (womparly) for the years 2007 
through 2013. We collect data for this variable from the World Bank Development 
Indicators, published on their website. 
For Hypothesis 2 we use the logarithm of the average gross domestic product 
(lngdp) per capita as the basis of our measurement for level of economic 
development. We also collect data for this variable from the World Bank 
Development Indicators, published on their website. 
For Hypothesis 3, we use the religiosity index to proxy for a country’s beliefs 
and cultural values. The religiosity index represents the percentage of the population 
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who self-describe themselves as a ‘religious person’ in the question worded as: 
Irrespective of whether you attend a place of worship or not, would you say you are a 
religious person, not a religious person or a convinced atheist?  Data on religiosity is 
sourced from WIN-Gallup International and from the World Religion Database 
(WRD). The former is the principal source while the latter was used to triangulate the 
data. The WIN-Gallup International ‘Religiosity and Atheism Index’ which measures 
global self-perceptions on beliefs is based on interviews with more than 50, 000 men 
and women selected from countries across the globe (WIN-Gallup International, 
2012).The World Religion Database contains detailed statistics on religious affiliation 
for every country of the world. It provides source material, including censuses and 
surveys, as well as estimates for every religion, offering a definitive picture of 
international religious demography.  
Control variables 
 
We control for a specific cultural dimension with a direct link to gender roles 
namely masculinity (Hofstede, 1988). According to Hofstede, (2001: 297), 
“masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men 
are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are 
supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.” 
Consistent with social role theoretical arguments, societies with high scores of 
masculinity are less likely to have more female directors. 
 In our second regression model, we also control for region to capture regional 
characteristics. We use broad regional classifications as follows Europe, Eastern 
Europe, Middle East and Africa, South America, North America and Asia. With 6 
regions, we model 5 dummy variables.  Region is considered an extremely broad 
ideological variable (Paxton, 1997), so ideally, we would explain any impact of 
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regionalism with the other variables included in the model. If region has a direct 
impact on the proportion of women on boards after the other variables are included, 
then we assume that would be an indication of some cultural variation not explained 
within the model.  
Model specification 
Using STATA we estimate the following regression: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
where women on board (womboard) is the dependent variable, women in parliament 
(womparly), the logarithm of GDP per capita (lngdp) and religiosity are endogenous 
regressors and masculinity (mascul) is a control variable that is taken as exogenous.  
As pointed out above, our independent variables are potentially endogenous, that is 
they may be systematically related to unobserved causes of the dependent variable, in 
this case, the proportion of women on boards. Violations of this sort commonly occur 
when factors related to independent variables, that predict outcome, are omitted from 
the regression model or when the independent variables themselves are measured with 
error (Woodridge, 2002). Of course, two-way causation is yet another condition but 
not the only concern.     
We thus used the 2SLS estimator or the instrumental variable (IV) method, an 
econometric method which is useful to purge coefficients of endogeneity bias (Baum, 
Schaffer, & Stillman, 2010) due to common methods, measurement error or 
simultaneity (Antonakis, et al., 2010). 
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To use an IV method, the first step is to identify a set of variables that are 
exogenous and that do not depend on other variables or disturbances in the system of 
equations (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart & Lalive, 2010). They should also be 
sufficiently strongly related to the problematic endogenous covariates (Bollen, 
2012).Moreover, the relationship between IVs and explanatory variables must be 
justified by economic theory, passing the ‘theoretical overidentification’ test before an 
empirical one (Antonakis, et al., 2010: 1104).  Indeed, scholars (Antonakis, et al., 
2010; Reeb, Sakakibara & Mahmood, 2012) contend that identifying suitable 
instruments that satisfy the conditions of relevance and exogeneity is the biggest 
challenge in applying the IV method.  
Once suitable instruments have been identified, the next step is to estimate the 
coefficients in the regression model using two-stage least squares (2SLS) or similar 
estimation methods. In this study we use 2SLS to estimate the coefficients in the 
regression model shown above. 2SLS allows for consistent estimation of 
simultaneous equations where one or more predictors are endogenous. This is because 
it handles endogeneity resulting from omitted variables, measurement error, 
simultaneity, and common method bias (Antonakis et al., 2010; Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005; Greene, 2008) 
Instrumental variables 
We identified instrumental variables for the three explanatory variables. For 
the explanatory variable-women in parliament, we use four instrumental variables 
namely proportional representation, political quotas, ethnic and linguistic 
fractionalization and number of years since first woman was elected to parliament.  
We provide the rationale for each of these instruments. First, political 
scientists accept the hypothesis that the presence of a proportional representation 
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system promotes female office-holding (Rule, 1987), since the system correlates the 
number of seats won by a political party with the number of votes cast for their party. 
In proportional representation systems, citizens vote for a party’s list rather than 
individual candidates, suggesting that women need not stand alone to achieve political 
office (Paxton, 1997), hence no bias attributable to gender. Second, gender political 
quotas have the guarantee that a certain proportion of women will be appointed 
members of parliament (Tripp & Kang, 2008). We, therefore, expect both 
proportional representation and political quotas to have a positive impact on the 
number of female members of parliament.  
Proportional representation equals one for each year in which candidates were 
elected using a proportional representation system; equals zero otherwise; averaged 
for the years 1975-2000. This historical data, taken from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer,  
&Walsh  (2001), cannot be changed by voting choices of the period 2007-2013, the 
sample period of this study. 
Fractionalization measures are based on the probability that two randomly 
drawn individuals (from a country) are not from the same group (ethnic) or do not 
speak the same language (linguistic). Both ethnic (ethnicfrac) and linguistic 
(linguifrac) fractionalization variables are drawn from Alesina, Devleeschauer, 
Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg (2003), and refer to the situation in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Scholars argue that highly fragmented countries are more likely to affect 
the composition and strength of political institutions such as parliament and 
government (Boubakri, Mansi & Safar, 2013). We argue that countries that are highly 
fractionalized, both from an ethnic and linguistic points of view, have over the years 
learnt to accept and to handle diversity. Such countries would, therefore, be more 
accepting of yet another form of diversity: gender. We, therefore, expect a positive 
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association between ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on one side and the 
proportion of female members of parliament on the other. Having been collected in 
the 1980s -1990s and the fact that the fragmentation of societies on the basis of 
ethnicity and language cannot be changed by the dynamics of board gender parity in 
recent years, suggest that these instruments are exogenous.    
An additional instrument for women in parliament is the number of years since 
the first women was elected to parliament (firstFemMP). We argue, therefore, that the 
presence of females in parliament is determined by institutional path dependencies 
(Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz, 2014), indeed a function of history. Path dependence 
describes the ‘causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence’ Pierson, 
2000: 252). Once a certain path has been chosen, future decisions are significantly 
influenced by a previous one, and more so in an incremental manner (Greener, 2005). 
Thus, countries with a longer history of appointing women to parliament are more 
likely to have more female members of parliament in our sample period. As a 
historical fact, defined by a specific time period, this variable cannot be influenced by 
the proportion of women in parliament and is free from any possible shock in the 
disturbances, and thus makes a good instrument. 
For the explanatory variable, lnGDP, we use an exogenous geographical 
feature of countries (latitude) as an instrument. Latitude, the distance from the equator 
measured in absolute degrees, affects climate and, therefore, aspects of agricultural 
productivity and disease. Previous studies have shown that countries closer to the 
equator are less developed. Latitude has, therefore, considerable explanatory power 
for the log of per capita GDP (Barro &McCleary, 2003), suggesting a positive 
relationship between latitude and economic growth. Latitude is completely exogenous 
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and can be used as an appropriate instrument as cannot be changed by economic 
growth nor with any level of shock from a disturbance. 
We also instrument economic growth with legal origin. We use a set of 
dummy variables for British, French, German, Scandinavian or Socialist legal origins. 
La Porta et al (1998) show that whether a country’s commercial or company law is 
based on British, French, German, Scandinavian or Socialist legal origins is important 
for explaining the country’s laws on creditors’ rights, shareholder rights and private 
property rights as well as the country’s level of bank and stock market development. 
Furthermore, Levine (1999) traces the effect of legal origin on financial development 
through to long-run economic growth, suggesting that legal origin influences 
economic growth by shaping national financial systems. The basic thrust of the legal 
origin theory is that common law (British), as opposed to French civil law and (to a 
lesser extent) German and Scandinavian civil law, is associated with more orientation 
towards institutions of the market instead of state intervention. According to studies 
based on this theory, common law countries tend to be economically more developed. 
Legal origin is a historical and static variable, reflecting the old age legal practices 
and thus today’s economic growth does not determine a country’s legal origin.  
For the explanatory variable-religiosity, we use two instrumental variables 
namely state regulation of religion and religious pluralism. An important theory of 
religiosity is the religion-market model (Barro & McCleary, 2003). According to this 
theory, religiosity depends on government intervention, including the regulation of the 
religion market by the state. Such an approach reduces the creativity and freedom of 
religious beliefs to spread and thus should have a negative impact on religiosity. State 
regulation (value 1 and 0 otherwise) refers to a situation in which the state appoints or 
approves church leaders. This designation comes from discussions in Barrett, (1982) 
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and Barrett, Kurian and Johnson (2001) and typically applies in the late 1970s. Data 
on state regulation is taken from Barro and McCleary (2003). 
Religious pluralism, measured by an index of the diversity of religions that 
exist in a country, is an attitude or policy regarding the diversity of religious belief 
systems co-existing in society. Early scholarly work based on the secularization 
hypothesis (Hume, 1757; Berger, 1967) provides the view that having more religious 
worldviews makes them common thus more human and less divine (Berger, 1967). 
While this may increase religious participation (the number of people attending 
churches, temples, synagogues, etc) however, it may lead to less religiosity (the 
number of people who are religious irrespective of attending a place of worship or 
not) in society. We, therefore, expect religious pluralism, as an instrumental variable, 
to have a negative impact on religiosity. Data on religious pluralism is taken from 
Barro and McCleary (2003). This data, like that on state regulation is in many ways 
historical, applying in the late 1970s, and thus makes both instrumental variables 
exogenous. 
Results 
The means, standard deviations and correlations among the study variables are 
presented in Table 2. The average for the proportion of women on boards across the 
45 countries in our sample is 9.24%, while that of women in parliament is higher at 
22.77%. The average for religiosity is 59.68%.   Correlations among the variables are 
generally modest.                                
Insert Table 2 about here 
As explained above, we tested the hypotheses using ivregress of STATA to 
obtain 2SLS estimates. The results of the tests are shown in Tables 3 and 4. As 
suggested by several scholars (e.g., Antonakis et al., 2010; Larcker & Rusticus, 
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2010), we report both the OLS and the 2SLS results. From Table 3, Model 1 shows 
OLS results. The coefficients for women in parliament (β =.25, p < .001) and 
religiosity (β =-.07, p <  .001) are as predicted. On average, a 1% increase in the 
number of women in parliament would translate to a 0.25% increase in the number of 
female directors on the board. On the other hand, a 1% increase in religiosity in a 
given country would lead to a decrease in the number of female directors by 0.07%. 
However, from the OLS results there is no support for the hypothesis that economic 
development is related to women on boards.  
Turning to the 2SLS estimation of the same equation, we start by explaining 
tests on the suitability of the instruments by  (1) making reference to the significance 
of instrumental variables, in first-stage regressions, that predict endogenous variables, 
(2) testing whether 2SLS is the preferred method to OLS by showing tests of 
endogeneity (Hausman test), (3) using the score chi square (Sargan) statistic to 
validate the exogeneity of instruments (test of over-identification) and (4) reporting 
the first-stage F-statistic.   
Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 report the 2SLS results. Models 2, 3, and 4 report first 
stage estimations, where women in parliament, lngdp and religiosity are respectively 
taken as endogenous regressors. Starting with the instruments for the variable, women 
in parliament, the coefficients on proportional representation (β =7.61, p < .001), on 
the period since the first women was elected to parliament (β =.13, p < .1) and on 
linguistic fractionalization (β = 9.10, p < .1) are all positive and significant as 
expected.   
The first instrument for economic development, latitude, is positive and 
significant (β =.03, p < .001) as expected. As instruments, legal origins are significant 
and positively related to economic development with varying coefficient sizes. 
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Specifically, British (β =2.21, p < .001), French (β =1.42, p < .001), German (β 
= 1.48, p <  .001), and Scandinavian (β =1.61, p < .05) 
As instruments, religious pluralism (β =-39.91, p <  .05) and state regulation (β 
= -19.32, p <  .05) are both negative and significantly correlated to the dependent 
variable religiosity as expected.  
We also carried out Wu-Hausman test for each of the endogenous regressors 
based on their respective instruments (results shown in Table 3 under the respective 
variables). The endogenous regressor women in parliament (womparly) [χ2(1)= 4.40, 
p= .04] is endogenous, while  economic freedom (lngdp) [χ2(1)= .06, p= .81] and 
religiosity [χ2(1)= 1.58, p= .22] are both shown as exogenous.  
While these tests for single endogenous regressors are indicative of the 
strengths and relevance of the instruments used, joint tests including all variables and 
their respective instruments tend to provide a better explanation for the state of 
variables and for the suitability of their instruments. We, therefore, turn to results for 
the full model or joint test, i.e. in the second stage of the 2SLS.  
Contrasting the results of the second-stage regression with OLS estimation, 
the Wu-Hausman test, for the full model, rejects the null that there is no endogeneity 
problem with OLS estimation [χ2(3)=3.37, p< .05] , suggesting that the 2SLS 
estimation is preferred to the OLS estimation.  
Using the Sargan test, we then examined the veracity (over-identification 
restriction) of the 2SLS model to ensure that the excluded instruments from the 
equation do not correlate with the disturbance of the dependent variable. The null 
hypothesis for the Sargan test is that the instruments are exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated 
with the error term. Thus, if the Sargan statistic is insignificant, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis. As shown in Model 5 the Sargan test for excluded instruments 
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indicate that the model constraints were tenable [χ2(9)= 13.54, p= .14], suggesting that 
the instruments as a group are exogenous. A post-estimation first-stage F-statistic test 
result of 22.46, p <  .001, suggests that the instruments are not weak.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Compared to the OLS estimates, discussed above, coefficients from 2SLS 
trend in the same direction, however, they are larger. For example, in Hypothesis 1, 
we proposed that the proportion of women in parliament positively impacts on the 
prevalence of women on boards of directors.  As predicted, the coefficient for this 
variable is significantly positive (β =.42, p < .001). On average, a 1% increase in the 
proportion of women in parliament increases the number of female directors on the 
board by 0.42%. 
In Hypothesis 2, we proposed that economic development positively impacts 
on the prevalence of female directors on boards. There is no support for this 
hypothesis as the coefficient for economic development is not significant.  
In Hypothesis 3, we proposed that religious beliefs negatively impact on the 
prevalence of female directors on boards. As we predicted, religiosity has a negative 
and significant impact on female board appointments (β =-0.12, p <  0.05). This 
suggests that a 1% increase in religiosity in a given country would lead to a decrease 
in the number of female directors by 0.12%.  
Shea’s Adjusted R-square results for the independent variables are reasonably 
high at 36%, 35% and 27% for women in parliament, economic freedom and 
religiosity respectively.  
We reran the tests, controlling for regional effects, as shown in the equation below.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
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Results from these tests are not significantly different from those reported in 
Table 3. We thus carried out further post-estimation tests (testparm in Stata) to 
establish the relevance of regional effects in our model. Results show that, for this 
study, regional effects do not matter for both OLS [F(5, 35)= 0.38, p >  F= .86]  and 
2SLS [χ2(5)= 2.74, p >  χ2= .74] .  
 
Discussion and conclusion  
 
The starting point of this study is that people in a society observe the activities 
of men and women and form corresponding beliefs about their psychological 
attributes. From the different activities of the sexes, they infer gender stereotypes-
shared expectations that women and men are intrinsically different. Guided by gender 
role beliefs that are shared within a society, citizens are socialized for the skills, traits, 
and preferences that support their society’s division of labor. This, we argue, could 
potentially explain the limited number of female directors on boards across societies. 
However, some countries have higher proportions of female directors than others, a 
situation we attribute to the variation of national social institutions. The study, thus, 
examines the social and economic factors that promote or inhibit the appointment of 
women to corporate boards of directors.  
First, we find that the representation of women in parliament impacts 
positively on the prevalence of women on boards. Drawing on social role theory, we 
argue that this finding explains that the presence of female directors in other key 
societal institutions helps to reduce traditional gender stereotypes, leading to 
acceptance of women beyond the politics. The presence of women in parliament and, 
by extension, in government could lead not only to acceptance of equal gender roles 
by both sexes, but could also motivate women to aspire for higher positions in several 
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other sectors including in business. The implication for this finding is that there is 
need to improve on the social institutions that promote the appointment of female 
directors to boards. For example, mechanisms that help improve the proportion of 
female members of parliament such as proportional representation and political quotas 
for female seats in parliament have an indirect influence on the proportion of female 
directors, and yet these, as a starting point, may be far easier to achieve. In that 
regard, more studies on other areas that may have impact on board composition or on 
the determinants of the same, such as on the proportion of women in the workforce or 
women in management, are necessary. 
The second hypothesis, that predicts a positive causal effect of economic 
freedom on the proportion of female directors, is not significantly supported. This 
lack of support could be explained by the fact that there are some developed countries 
with low levels of female representation (e.g., Japan) and some with high levels of 
female representation (e.g., Norway). The same could be said about countries with 
low levels of development.  
The third hypothesis, also drawing on social role theory, emphasizes that 
religion encourages and reinforces values that are consistent with traditional gender 
roles. Unlike other social institutions discussed in this paper, therefore, religiosity has 
a negative effect on the prevalence of women on boards, and such was our hypothesis.  
This hypothesis was supported. While it is easier to change the other social 
institutions, changing attitudes that emanate from cultural institutions such as religion 
is difficult to achieve. As such, understanding religious dynamics in society is a 
central task of studies on gender, in general, and on women on boards, in particular. 
The long arm of the Catholic church’s opposition to birth control, for example, 
demonstrates the power of religion in enforcing traditional gender roles.  
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Several other messages, consistent with dominant cultural injunctions are 
observable across religious groups. Moreover, religion adds to these injunctions the 
message that they are natural and part of the universe, serving as an important vehicle 
for the internalization of cultural codes and at the same time making them more rigid 
and difficult to alter.  In the context of this study, religion plays a key role in the 
dynamics of women’s lack of representation on boards, and could potentially be used 
to change this situation, however, difficult. It is, therefore, important not only to 
understand the complexities of the relationship between religion and culture but to 
change the way world religions work in order to achieve gender parity in corporate 
boards and beyond.   
Drawing on a key societal lens i.e. social role theory and recognizing the role 
of social institutions in either upholding or discouraging gender stereotypes, the study 
demonstrates the salience of the institutional environment in understanding board 
gender diversity, offering a number of contributions. First, this paper contributes to 
the growing corporate governance literature on female top executive leadership by 
introducing theoretical perspectives from social psychology and gender studies to 
frame the analysis – as called for by various researchers (e.g., Adams & Flynn, 2005; 
Terjesen et al., 2009). 
Second, drawing on corporate governance, religious, economic and gender 
studies, this paper provides an explanation for the current state of board gender 
diversity and insights to gender role attitudes in a relatively large number of countries. 
Moreover and relatedly, a further contribution beyond the substantial findings is that 
this study is one of the first to use a 2SLS procedure to identify institutional 
determinants of female board appointments. To our knowledge, this statistical 
approach, that ensures consistency of estimates in the face of endogeneity, has not been 
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used in research on female board appointments, reducing confidence in their causal 
claims. We, therefore, heed recent calls by scholars (Antonakis et al., 2010; Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010; Reeb et al., 2012) who urge researchers to take endogeneity problems 
more seriously. 
Third, this study provides enhanced understanding of the particular 
institutional forces that impede or facilitate women's participation in corporate 
leadership in a number of countries, including non-Western societies. Such 
knowledge assists policy makers and development workers (e.g. from the UN) to craft 
programs and policies that effectively address gender equality in general and women 
participation in corporate affairs in particular. Moreover, such knowledge could help 
firms that operate in specific countries to understand the dynamics of local 
environments on matters that concern their practices on board composition and equal 
opportunities.  
Indeed, this research has implications for organizational leaders. To start with, 
the country variables investigated in this study are easily observable and measurable, 
and, therefore, provide important insights for managers. For companies that decide to 
operate in specific countries, setting up their headquarters there, we consider that 
managers could react to institutional contexts that are conducive to non-acceptance of 
gender diversity on boards. Based on our results they could decide to enter countries 
with favorable institutions with greater possibility of utilizing both female and male 
talent on their boards. Alternatively, they may enter countries with institutional 
barriers and then utilize female talent as a competitive advantage, since on average 
many firms will not be inclined to appoint female directors. 
Moreover, while companies may not change the country’s institutions, they 
may draw up internal procedures and practices that may improve the position of 
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women not only for the sake of board appointments but for motivating female 
employees in general. 
We also consider that our paper has implications for policy makers. For 
example, the fact that political office by women encourages more female board 
appointments suggests that governments may need to examine their political policies, 
if they are to achieve greater female board presence. As such, governments with fewer 
women members of parliament or in other public social spheres may come up with 
policies that encourage or facilitate gender parity in such areas. Such efforts may 
include legislating in favor of women empowerment, alongside targeted training 
programs to ensure that women succeed in these roles. Moreover, since societies that 
are highly religious are less likely to achieve board gender parity, we suggest that 
policy makers should push for a mandatory approach to female board appointments, 
such as the use of board quotas, indeed, a current argument in governance studies 
(Tejersen et al., 2014).  
Limitations and areas for future research 
Notwithstanding the timeliness of this research and the contributions discussed 
above, we acknowledge a few limitations of this study. First, while we use data that is 
sufficiently rich, and from reliable sources, to test our hypotheses, secondary data 
have some obvious disadvantages, as we did not have full control of sample selection 
or the development of our dependent variable measure. Despite the use of a strong 
statistical corrective technique in IV estimation, future studies could provide an 
alternative approach based on interviews, surveys and case studies. Second, as is 
common in empirical research, we cannot tell exactly whether our variables measure 
what we think they do.  For example, we did not consider the specific aspects of 
religiosity to be able to determine the exact and fine-grained effect of religion on the 
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presence of women on corporate boards. Future studies could distinguish the types of 
religious affiliation and their respective effect on female board appointments.  
Third, at the center of the discussion between religion and gender, in general, 
and female directors, in particular, is the issue of power. Both religion and gender are 
centrally implicated in unequal distributions of power, and that their interplays serve 
and seek to reinforce existing distributions of power or to change them – in various 
ways and by various means. Future studies could explore power as a key intervening 
variable between religiosity and the appointment of female leaders.  
Moreover, the institutional context of our study is limited to only forty-five 
countries. Although the sample has countries from every region of the world and the 
issues considered are universal in nature (e.g., religion), undergirded by a social 
psychological lens in social role theory, suggesting a reasonable level of the 
generalizability of our findings, however, the regional representation is not evenly 
distributed. As country data on board composition continues to get better in more 
countries, further studies could benefit from larger samples.    
While this paper focuses on issues of gender, many of the arguments made in 
it may also apply to other minority groups with diverse backgrounds (e.g., race or 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or age). As is well documented, members of 
these groups are also disadvantaged due to their group’s low social status (e.g., 
Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2006) and this may extend to cases of lower representation in 
corporate leadership (Catalyst, 2007).  Moreover, in many national and organizational 
contexts, these groups of minorities are also likely to be perceived as atypical leaders.  
In conclusion, this paper has provided factors that explain the variation of 
female board appointments across countries. Being part of the general theme of 
gender equality and the attendant benefits of diversity in corporations, the presence of 
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females on boards, as a study area, continues to be of great importance. A central 
theme in this paper is that the lack of female board members resides in differences in 
societal roles that lead men and women to demonstrate and value different types of 
interpersonal behavior. As such corporate leadership through the institution of the 
board is considered as the preserve of men. This paper provides the thesis that as a 
social construct, these gender role stereotypes can be better understood by examining 
the social institutions that potentially uphold or minimize this perception. Such factors 
include the proportion of women in government/parliament, economic development 
and religiosity. The study finds support for the hypotheses that the presence of more 
female members in parliament increases female board appointments and that more 
religious societies tend to have fewer females on corporate boards. 
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                        Table 1: Distribution of countries by region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region Number of 
Countries 
Asia 13 
Europe 16 
Eastern Europe  4 
South America  4 
North America 3 
Africa & Middle East 5 
 
Total 45 
41 
 
 
 
                       Table 2: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1.womboard 9.24 6.38     
2.womparly 22.77 10.69 0.60**    
3. lngdp 9.73 1.13 0.39** 0.50**   
4. relig 59.68 26.04 -0.39** -0.29 -0.50**  
5. mascul 51.07 19.26 -0.43* -0.39 -0.11 -0.03 
                   Notes: **p < .05; *p < 0.1 
Abbreviated variables: women on the board (womboard), women in parliament (womparly), logarithm of gross 
domestic product    (lngdp), religiosity (relig), masculinity (mascul) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
    Table 3: OLS and 2SLS regression results: Dependent variable- proportion of women on the board 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, N= 45,   *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
Abbreviated variables: women in parliament (womparly), logarithm of gross domestic product (lngdp), religiosity (relig), 
masculinity (mascul), political quotas (polquota), proportional representation (proprep), number of years since a female member 
was appointed to parliament (firstFemMP), ethnic fractionalization (enthnifrac),  linguistic fractionalization (linguifrac), legal 
British origin , (Leg_Brit), legal French origin (Leg_Frenc), legal German origin (Leg_Germ), legal Scandinavian origin 
(Leg_Scan), religious pluralism (relplural), state regulation of religion (stateregrel). 
 
 
 
Model 1 
OLS 
Model 2  
(1st stage) 
womparly 
Model 3 
(1st stage) 
lngdp 
Model 4  
(1st stage) 
religiosity 
Model 5 
2nd Stage 
2SLS            
Shea’s 
Adj R2 
Intercept 
14.40** 
(9.78) 
9.67 
(9.34) 
6.84*** 
(.96) 
124.62*** 
(25.55) 
26.74** 
(13.53) 
womparly 
.26*** 
(.09)  
  
.42***                .36 
(.12) 
lngdp -.20 (.88)  
  
-1.67                  .35 
(1.20) 
relig 
-.07** 
(.03) 
 
  
-.12**               .27 
(.05) 
mascul 
-.09** 
(.04) 
-.04 
(.08) 
-.00 
(.01) 
-.24 
(.22) 
-.07 
(.04) 
polquota 
 
-4.71 
(3.37)  
.87** 
(.35) 
9.92 
(9.21)  
proprep 
 7.61*** 
(2.55) 
.21 
(.26) 
-15.28** 
(6.96)  
firstFemMP 
 
.13* 
(.07)  
-.00 
(.01) 
-04 
 (.19)  
ethnifrac 
 
.67 
(7.15) 
.31 
(.73) 
30.98 
(19.56)  
linguifrac 
 9.10* 
(5.93) 
-1.74*** 
(.61) 
.38 
(16.23)  
latitude 
 
.13 
(0.10)  
.03*** 
(.01) 
-.76*** 
(.27)  
Leg_Brit 
 5.47 
(4.87) 
2.21*** 
(.50) 
-14.45 
(13.32)  
Leg_Frenc 
 8.61* 
(5.08)  
1.42*** 
(.52) 
-7.37 
(13.91)  
Leg_Germ 
 4.79 
(4.89)  
1.48*** 
(.50) 
-14.15 
(13.36)  
Leg_Scan 
 16.26** 
(7.33) 
1.61** 
(.75) 
-20.44 
(20.05)  
relplural 
 16.39** 
(7.30) 
1.78** 
(.75) 
-38.91** 
(19.98)  
stateregrel 
 
.79 
(2.97) 
-.15 
(.30) 
-19.32** 
(8.13)  
R2       .48 .72 .74 .65 .41 
Sargan  
 
  χ2(9)= 13.54, p=.14 
Hausman  χ
2(1)= 4.40, p=.04 
 
χ2(1)= .06, p=.81 χ2(1)=1.58, p=.22 χ2(3)= 3.37, p=.03 
F-Statistic   F(12, 31)= 5.37*** F(12, 31)= 7.29*** F(12,31)= 4.85*** 22.46*** 
